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One may expect to see an increasing use of the public policy argument in re-
strictive covenant cases in those states which have recently enacted legislation
against other forms of racial discrimination. While the technique employed by
the Ontario court does not appear to be readily adaptable to the American legal
system, the decision does constitute an invitation to those state courts which are
unsympathetic to restrictive covenants to limit the influence of the Corrigan
decision.
LEGALITY OF WAGE READJUSTMENT PLANS UNDER
THE OVERTIME PROVISION OF THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The most troublesome question which the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938'
has presented to the courts has been the interpretation of that part of Section
7 (a) of the Act which provides that the employee shallbe paid for overtime work
at not less than one and one-half times "the regular rate at which he is em-
ployed. ' '2 In attempting to comply with this.provision of the Act the employer
is confronted with several problems. In the first place he wishes to maintain his
wages and hours at their former over-all level, so that his.labor costs will not be
increased by compliance. In the second place he wishes to avoid the necessity
for spreading work brought about by extra labor cost for extra hours, since it
may be uneconomical for him to reallocate the work in his plant for an increased
force of workers, all of whom work only regular time; likewise labor unions
whose members would suffer from reduced take-home pay by such a result
might find it to their interest to support plans designed to avoid it.3 And in the
took the position that the court should consider evidence of the notorious dearth of housing
for Negroes in the District of Columbia in making its decision whether to enforce a restrictive
covenant. The same judge took a similar position in his dissent in Mays v. Burgess, 152 F. 2d
123, 126, 127 (App. D.C., 1946).
152 Stat. io6o (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (1942).
2 The full text of Section 7(a) is as follows: No employer shall, except as otherwise provided
in this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce-
(i) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from the effective
date of this section,
(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second year from such date, or
(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second year from
such date,
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above
specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
3 The Act was designed primarily for the relief of unorganized, unskilled, and unemployed
workers. Presidential messages, 1941 Wage & Hour Man. 747 (I937), and 82 Cong. Rec. ii
(1937). Its passage met with opposition from some labor unions, particularly the American
Federation of Labor, which in 1937 went on record opposing it. N.Y. Times, p. I, col. 2
(May 24, 1937), because it feared that the minimum wage would tend to become the maxi-
mum wage. It was estimated by the Department of Labor that by 1945 upwards of i,oooooo
workers would receive wage increases because of the law, but 4,000,000 would have their hours
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third place both employer and employeemay find it desirable to stabilize weekly
wages, a result which the Act's emphasis on the hourly wage may tend to hin-
der. The numerous plans produced by various employers in attempts to solve
one or another of these problems and still comply with the Act have forced the
courts to search for a definition of "regular rate" and to reconsider the aims of
the Act.
Ordinarily the legality of the scheme will depend on whether the new hourly
rate used in computing overtime payments is considered the "regular rate" as
required by the Act, or merely an arbitrary or fictitious figure. Thus, where be-
fore the Act an employer paid a fixed weekly wage of $4o for variable hours and,
to meet the requirements of the Act, commutes the salary into a $i an hour
wage but provides that, should an employee work more than 40 hours a week,
the statutory maximum, his hourly rate would be reduced in such a way that
the regular plus overtime rate would still average $i per hour, it is obvious that
Section 7(a) has not been satisfied because the reduced rate which would be
used in computing the overtime wage was not the "regular rate," but an entirely
fictitious figure. The arrangement is in effect a contract to pay straight time re-
gardless of the number of hours worked.4 While the scheme in the foregoing case
is quite transparent, courts have been presented with plans which, though aim-
ing at the same result, have been far more ingenious and plausible, and which
have therefore presented a difficult problem of interpretation.
On June 8, 1942, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down two
decisions on this question, Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missels and
Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp.6 Their joining on the Supreme Court calendar sug-
gests that the Court intended to give a comprehensive clarification of a some-
what muddled situation. The continued, if not increased, amount of litigation
since these two cases indicates how unsuccessful this attempt has been.
This unfortunate result has followed from the ever more apparent incon-
sistency of the two cases which was quite evident to the four dissenting justices
in the Belo case. In the Misset case the employer paid a fixed salary for fluctuat-
ing hours in excess of the statutory maximum. There was no fixed hourly rate,
but the salary was large enough to cover both regular and overtime work at the
statutory minimum hourly rate. 7 This plan, the court held, was unsatisfactory
of work reduced. In practice, therefore, this provision of the Act was expected to be a work-
sharing rather than a wage-raising measure. N.Y. Times, § i, p. 12, col. 3 (Aug. 14, 1938). The
actual consequences of the Act in this connection are difficult to analyze, since the supervening
defense and war programs created an abnormal condition in the labor market.
4 Cf. Walling v. Green Head Bit & Supply Co., 138 F. 2d 453 (C.C.A. ioth, 1943).
s316 U.S. 572 (1942).
6316 U.S. 624 (1942).
7 The employee worked, on the average, 65 hours and received $27.50. At this time the legal
minimum for the first 42 hours was $.3o. His regular pay at the minimum would therefore have
been $12.6o; his overtime pay for 23 hburs at $.45, $1o.35. His total compensation at the
minimum rate, $22.95, would therefore have been less than what he actually received.
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because the "regular rate" was not, as was assumed in the plan, the statutory
minimum rate, but rather the average hourly rate, or the quotient of the total
wage divided by the hours worked, and overtime payment was one and one-
half times the regular rate for hours employed beyond the statutory maximum.
8
This construction of Section 7(a), the Court felt, was necessary to give effect to
the aim of the Act which, it said, was not only to raise substandard wages, but
also, by requiring extra pay for overtime regardless of how high the regular rate
is, to induce the employer to spread employment.9
In the Belo case the employer, to meet the requirements of the Act, had con-
verted a fixed weekly salary for variable hours into an hourly wage. To keep the
weekly pay stabilized at the then current figure, he entered into contracts with
his employees individually which in each case specified a basic hourly rate for
the legal maximum regular hours and not less than one and one-half times that
rate per hour for overtime, with a guaranty of a weekly minimum pay approxi-
mating the old salary. Under this plan the employee worked about ten hours
more than the statutory maximum regular hours before he became entitled to
any pay in addition to his weekly guaranty, and when he did he received surplus
compensation at one and one-half times the basic hourly contract rate. 0 The
basic rate was in all cases in excess of the legal minimum. The Court, in a five-to-
four decision, upheld this formula because the basic contract rate was the "regu-
lar rate" within the meaning of Section 7(a) and there was nothing in the Act
which prohibited the payment of more for overtime than one and one-half times
the basic rate, as was often the effect of the guaranteed weekly minimum. The
Missel case was distinguished on the-ground that in that case there was no
stated hourly wage and no provision for overtime."r
Although it is easy to point to some distinguishing facts between the two
cases, the basic theories and even the broad dicta in the two cases are difficult to
reconcile. In the Missel case the Court defines "regular rate" as the quotient of
the weekly wage divided by the number of hours worked,' 2 which rate is then
used in computing the overtime pay, while in the Belo case a contract rate which
does not correspond to the quotient is acceptable. Thus the plan in the Missel
case could easily be legalized under the Belo decision by setting up a more or
8 Thus if the workweek is 65 hours the average hourly rate in this case is $.423 ($27.5o - 65).
Since the worker is entitled to an additional 5o per cent of the regular rate for the 23 hours of
overtime, he must be paid an additional $4.86 ($.2115X23). His total pay will therefore be
$32.36.
9 This conclusion is borne out by the legislative history of the Act. H.R. Rep. No. 1452,
75th Cong., ist Sess. (i937). In the debates in Congress over the Act this object of spreading
employment was emphasized by Senators Barkley and Healy. 81 Cong. Rec. 7941, 7848
(1938). See the Federal Wages and Hours Act, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 646, 665, 677 (1939).
To A typical contract provided that the regular rate would be $.67 for the first 44 hours, the
then statutory maximum for regular hours, and one and one-half times this, or $i, for over-
time hours. The weekly guaranty was $40. To earn more than theguaranty the employee in this
particular example had to work more than 541 hours, and when he did he received $r per hour.
"316 U.S. 624, 634 (1942). ,316 U.S. 572, 580 n. i6 (1942).
NOTES
less arbitrary hourly rate without changing any condition of employment.
Therefore, as Mr. Justice Reed points out in his dissent, if the congressional
intent behind Section 7(a) was, as was reasonably assumed in the Missel case,
to spread employment, it was frustrated in the Belo case.,13
Ever since the district court's decision of the Belo case it has been the main-
stay of employers in frequent litigations with employees or with the Wage and
Hour Administrator. The Supreme Court decision in the case came at a very
opportune time for many employers. Shortly before, in Carleton Screw Products
Co. v. Fleming,4 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had indi-
cated that bonuses were subject to overtime payments under Section 7(a). The
Administrator had from the very first urged that the Act applied to piecework
earnings, as was later held by the Supreme Court in United States v. Rosenwas-
ser.'5 With the Missel case eliminating the fixed above-minimum wage plan, a
new and legal, but not uneconomical, readjustment plan was needed. Under the
Belo holding a workweek longer than the legal maximum can be retained with-
out an increase in pay. This is done by fixing by agreement a "regular rate" at
or above the legal minimum, yet low enough to produce, if multiplied by the
hours worked, a figure smaller than the old weekly wage. The old wage can then
be paid in the form of a minimum or by adding bonuses. Since 1942 a large por-
tion of the litigation concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act has involved
plans aiming at a similar result and their scrutiny by the courts to determine
whether the contract rate set was "regular" or fictitious.
Although in the Belo case the Court apparently based its decision on the
presence of an agreed-upon regular rate, it was not prevented from holding two
years later in Walling v. Helnerich & Payne, I1C.16 that the agreed-upon rates
in the so-called "split-day" plan were fictitious. Under the split-day plan a long
workday of ten hours, for example, is divided into two shifts. The first five hours
are assigned a specified hourly rate above the legal minimum, which is the
"regular rate"; the remaining five hours are treated as overtime and their rate
is one and one-half times the "regular rate." The regular and overtime rates are
so calculated as to insure that the total wages for each workday would continue
the same as before the Act.Y7 At first glance the plan appears generous, in that
13 316 U.S. 624, 635 (1942). The inconsistency of the two cases is even more apparent from
the lower court's opinion in the Belo case, in which it was stated that the purpose of the over-
time provisions of the Act was not to discourage or limit overtime, but to raise substandard
wages. Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corp., 121 F. 2d 207, 215 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941). This interpreta-
tion of Section 7(a) is clearly contrary to that in the Missel case. See Overtime Compensation
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act for Workers with a Fluctuating Number of Hours per
Week, 52 Yale L. J. 159 (1942).
14 126 F. 2d 537 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942).
'-'323 U.S. 360 (1944). x6323 U.S. 37 (1944).
17 If a worker's daily wage was $5 before the Act, his regular rate would be set at $.4o per
hour. Under the split-day plan he would receive $2 for the regular shift of the first five hours
and time and one-half or $3 for the second or overtime shift of the remaining five hours. His
daily wage of $5 would thus be retained.
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time and a half is paidforless than 40 hours,but it is evident that an extra work-
day bringing the total weekly time over 4o hours would produce no change in
the average effective rate. 8 The Court, basing its holding on the aim of the over-
time provision as interpreted by the Missel case, reversed the lower courts and
held the plan illegal, because to approve such an artificial scheme, it felt, "would
exalt ingenuity over reality."'19 The Belo case, on which both lower courts had
relied for their decision, was distinguished in a somewhat summary fashion.20
The trend of the decisions, especially as evidenced by the cases before the low-
er federal courts, has been away from the Belo case. Cases where no hourly rate
was set though the weekly wages were above the minimum have presented little
difficulty and have been disposed of under the Missel case. 2x Where the plan
has included an agreed-upon rate, the first and obvious limitation has been that
this contract rate must be one actually known and accepted by the employees;
a mere bookkeeping transaction is insufficient. .2 Where the contract rate is sub-
ject to change with the number of hours worked, it is not the regular rate within
the Act.'3 In cases very similar to the Belo case courts have frequently found
distinguishing facts, though sometimes with doubtful perception. Thus, in
Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co.,24 the court, faced with a plan that
differed from the Belo plan only in that the employees received a bonus instead
of a minimum guaranty in addition to set hourly wages, held it void under the
Helmerich decision. The Belo case, the circuit court said, "offers difficulty" be-
cause it "involved a pay arrangement both unique and difficult to analyze.' '25
Of the very few cases that have purported to follow Walling v. Belo Corp., most
have not involved the real problem of that case, but rather an actual reduction
IS Under the described split-day plan of io hours the employee would have to work 8 days
a week or, at least, 8o hours a week before his average effective rate would be increased. A
similar split-day plan was held unlawful in Walling v. Alaska Pacific Consol. Mii. Co., 152 F.
2d 812 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945).
'9 323 U.S. 37, 42 (1044).
2o1bid.
21Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88 (1942); United States v. Rosen-
wasser, 323 U.S. 360 (1944); Seneca Coal & Coke Co. v. Lofton, 136 F. 2d 359 (C.C.A. ioth,
1943), cert. den. 320 U.S. 772 (1943); Kreeft v. R. W. Bates Piece Dye Works, Inc., ISO F. 2d
8M8 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945); Landreth v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 147 F. 2d 446 (C.C.A. 8th, 1945);
Kappler v. Republic Pictures Corp., 59 F. Supp. 112 (Iowa, 1945); Lorber v. Rosow, 58 F.
Supp. 341 (Conn., '944); Walling v. Stone, 131 F. 2d 46x (C.C.A. 7th, 1942); Tidewater
Optical Co. v. Wittkamp, 179 Va. 545, 19 S.E. 2d 897 (1942); Fleming v. Pearson Hardwood
Flooring Co., 39 F. Supp. 300 (Tenn., 1941); St. John v. Brown, 38 F. Supp. 385 (Tex., 1941).
- Walling v. Castle, 153 F. 2d 923 (C.C.A. 5th, 1946); Walling v. West Kentucky Coal Co., -
6o F. Supp. 681 (Tenn., I944); Seneca Coal & Coke Co. v. Lofton, 136 F. 2d 359 (C.C.A.
xoth, 1943), cert. den. 320 U.S. 772 (1943).
23Walling v. Green Head Bit & Supply Co., 138 F. 2d 453 (C.C.A. ioth, i943).
a 459 F. Supp. 291 (N.Y., 1945).
2s59 F. Supp. 291, 293 (N.Y., 1945); see also Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming,
126 F. 2d 537 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942), decided before the Belo case was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
490,
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of the effective hourly rate by agreement with employees. 26 This is permissible
despite the fact that Section i8 of the Act purports to forbid such a result, since
that section has been held to be no more than a pious hope27
The latest indication of the questionable effect of the Belo case as a precedent
came with two recent and again simultaneous decisions of the Supreme Court.
In Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co.28 the employees had formerly
received piecework wages. After the Act the employer and workers agreed upon
a regular hourly rate above the legal minimum, but less than the hourly aver-
age earned by piecework; for overtime hours i5o per cent of the regular rate
was to be paid. However, if the piecework earnings at the old rate exceeded the
wages at the hourly rate, as they almost-invariably did, the workers would be
entitled to the piecework wages. The second case, Walling v. Harnischfeger
Corp.,y 9 involved essentially the same plan, with the difference that the agreed-
upon "regular rate" was more closely related to hourly piecework earnings, or,
as it was there called, incentive bonus pay. In fact, the overtime hourly rate
exceeded, though not by 50 per cent, the piecework earnings per hour.3O The
Supreme Court held both of these plans unlawful because in both cases the
regular rate set up by agreement was not the significant figure of the contract
and overtime should have been computed by adding 5o per cent to the average
hourly piecework earnings. The Court defined "regular rate" as the quotient of
the weekly earnings divided by the number of hours worked3'-the definition
261n White v. Witwer Grocer Co., 132 F. 2d io8 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942) the hourly rate was re-
duced after the Act from $.35 to $.3z and the new rate was the basis of all payments. No mini-
mum or bonuses were involved. Likewise in Shepler v. Crucible Fuel Co. of America, 6o F.
Supp. 26o (Pa., 1943), a fixed monthly wage was commuted into a hourly wage which became
the effective rate. The cases that have actually followed the Belo case have presented fact
situations almost identical with that case. Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co., 52 F. 2d 622 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945); Atlantic Co. v. Walling, 13i F. 2d 518 (C.C.A. 5th,
1942).
27In a few early cases actual reductions were held unlawful. Williams v. General Mills, 39
F. Supp. 849 (Ohio, 1941); Anuchick v. Transamerican Freight Lines Inc., 46 F. Supp. 86i
(Mich., 1942). Since then, however, it has become clear that Section 18 has no prohibitory
effect. Shepler v. Crucible Fuel Oil Co. of America, 6o F. Supp. 26o (Pa., 1943); White v.
Witwer Grocer Co., 132 F. 2d io8 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942); Remer v. Czaja, 36 F. Supp. 629 (Md.,
194). That this was the intent of Congress is indicated by the fact that violation of Section 18
was not included among the prohibitions of Section i5(a), and that penalties were not pro-
vided forits enforcement under Section i6 of theAct. 52 Stat. io68 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 215,
216 (1942). See also the interpretation of the Wage and Hour Administrator in Wage and
Hour Division, Interpretative Bulletin No. 4, at p. 7 (,940).
2'325 U.S. 419 (945). 29 325 U.S. 427 (945).
30 This is shown by the following example. A worker is assigned a basic hourly rate of $.go.
His average hourly earning from piecework is $i., which is lower than his overtime rate of
$1.35. However, if he works So hours a week, the regular workweek being 4o hours, his piece-
work earnings of $So. willstillbe somewhat higher than his total pay at regular and overtime
rates ($.9oX4o+$1.3SX io=$49.5o). The worker's effective hourly rate thus does not increase
until he works considerably more than the statutory maximum hours. This was also the effect
of the Belo plan.
3X325 U.S. 419, 424 (I945).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
given in the Missel case. In a dissenting opinion Mr. Chief Justice Stone indi-
cated that the majority opinion was inconsistent with the Belo case. He sug-
gested that there was nothing in the Act which prevented in the Youngerman
case the apportioning of the amount by which the bonus or piecework pay ex-
ceeded the guaranteed hourly wages, in proportion to the regular and overtime
hours worked;32 yet not even in his opinion was it argued that the contract
hourly rate validated this plan, as was held in the Belo case. 33
Since these two latest decisions of the Supreme Court it has already become
clear that the Court has failed again to settle definitely the interpretation of
Section 7(a). The existing uncertainty is due to the Supreme Court's insistence
on harmonizing its latest holdings with that in the Belo case. In their most
recent decisions the federal courts have reflected the holding of the Youngerman
and Harnischfeger cases; 34 but in a case closely approximating the fact-situation
in the Belo case, a lower court is practically forced to hold that the contract rate
is the regular rate.35
Thus, in spite of the impressive array of cases in point, the employer who has
readjusted his wage-and-hourpolicy for the purpose of the Act is still faced with
some uncertainty as to the legality of this plan in so far as he relies on the Belo
case. It is clear now that an hourly rate must be fixed and agreed upon by
employers and employees since it will not be implied if a straight periodical wage
is paid. Production or incentive bonuses and piecework earnings are likewise
32325 U.S. 427,434(945). The Chief Justice's suggestion is aimed to overcome themajor-
ity's objection that however high a piecework wage is it cannot of itself be taken to include any
of the wage differential which the Act requires for overtime hours. He proposes this solution:
If, for example, the piecework earnings for a 5o hour workweek total $66 and the minimum
at the set hourly rate of $i totals $55 ($IX4o+$I.5oXIo), the $ii by which the piece-
work pay exceeds the minimum hourly wage should be apportioned and added to the hourly
rate when computing the worker's wage. Thus, on the worker's paycheck the regular rate in
this instance should be raised to $1.2o. This rate, when multiplied by the hours worked, will
produce the desired amount of $66 ($1.2oX4o+$I.8oX io=$66).
Such a computation may be in harmony with the Belo case, but overlooks completely the
decision in United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 36o (i944), in which the Chief Justice con-
curred, which held that piecework wages had to be reduced to an hourly rate under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. If such arithmetical juggling as suggested here by Mr. Chief Justice
Stone is permissible, a straight piecework wage as paid in the Rosenwasser case, or even a
straight weekly wage as in the Missel case, can easily be apportioned in the same way by a
mere bookkeeping transaction. See also Walling v. Castle, 153 F. 2d 923 (C.C.A. 5th, 1946),
where a similar arrangement was disallowed.
33 In a short and somewhat obscure concurring opinion, Mr. justice Frankfurter suggests
that the "regular rate" in the Belo plan was not "a mere artifice unrelated to wage-earning
actualities." 325 U.S. 427, 433 (1945). He fails to make clear why this is so, however.
34 Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 'is F. 2d 311 (C.C.A. 3d, 1945); Walling v. Uhlman Grain
Co., 15 F. 2d 381 (C.C.A. 7th, 1945). In the latter case the circuit court of appeals which had
originally approved the Harnischfeger plan on the strength of the Belo case only to have its
holding reversed by the Supreme Court, stated: "If the Supreme Court has not repudiated its
holding in the Belo case, it has come so close as to leave no room for its application except upon
an identical state of facts." Ibid., at 383.
35 Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 152 F. 2d 622 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945). The
dissenting opinion in this case contended that the Belo case was no longer reliable as a prece-
dent. Ibid., at 624.
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subject to overtime payment. The "regular rate" cannot fluctuate with the
number of hours worked. The split-day plan is illegal because the hourly rates
are fictitious. As for the current judicial construction of "regular rate," the only
safe statement is that, where straight-time pay, bonus, or piecework earnings
are commuted into hourly wages, it is the quotient of wages divided by hours,
except in a situation like the Belo case, where it is the contract rate. The courts,
however, because of the extensive inroads which have been made on the holding
in that case, will be inclined to seize upon the slightest fact in order to distin-
guish a similar case, and to apply the general rule.36 Probably the only safe plan
for an employer who seeks to avoid an increase in total pay due to overtime is
an actual reduction of the hourly rate effected through collective bargaining, but
even such a reduction has been closely scrutinized and voided because it was
found to be only a bookkeeping transaction.37
Perhaps the only justification for the Belo case is that its plan sought to
stabilize the wages of employees with variable working hours. However, other
plans with a similar aim have been voided because they did not comply with
the requirements of the Act.38 The Wage and Hour Administrator has proposed
two stabilization plans which he considers legal; the time-off plan and the pre-
payment plan.39 Under the first of these plans an employee who works overtime
in one week is laid off a sufficient number of hours during some other week to
offset the amount of overtime worked and is paid a stable wage biweekly or
monthly. In the prepayment plan the employer pays the worker a sum in
excess of what he earns in a particular week and the excess is considered a pre-
payment for overtime work in a subsequent week. Neither of the two plans is
very satisfactory because both involve considerable bookkeeping and are, ac-
cording to the Administrator, inapplicable to salaried employees working irregu-
lar hours;40 thus it is not surprising that the search for another legal plan
continues.
36 Note 34 supra.
37 Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., ix F. 2d 311 (C.C.A. 3d, i945), where the court, after a
close examination of old and new sample paychecks, found that the new weekly pay was exact-
ly the same as the old wage although if the new "regular rate" had been properly used in the
computation the new total would have varied very slightly from the old pay. The court con-
cluded that the adopted "regular rate" had not actually been used in the computation and held
the plan void. In indicating the difficulties involved in an actual reduction in the "regular
rate," the Administratorhas pointed out that employees are unlikelyto acquiesce in a reduction
unless the employer assures them that they will not lose any pay by it. Yet, if the employer
guarantees them their former wages, their true rate of pay remains unchanged, while if there is
no express 6r implied guaranty, the employer's payment of wages for less than a full week
on the basis of the old rate would indicate that the adopted rate is a mere bookkeeping figure
for the computation of overtime and not the true rate. Wage and Hour Division, Interpretative
Bulletin No. 4, at p. 7 (1940).
38 Walling v. Castle, 153 F. 2d 923 (C.C.A. 5th, 1946); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323
U.S. 37 (1944).
-9 Wage and Hour Division, Interpretative Bulletin No. 4 (1940).
40 Ibid., at ii and i6. This results from the consideration that, since a salaried employee is
entitled to full pay even if he has worked less than the regular time in a week, full pay for such
a week cannot be said to be compensation for excess hours in another week.
